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Reading Round-Up: 2/12/10 
February 12, 2010 in The Five-List Plan by The China Beat | Permalink 
1. China Beat team members Jeff Wasserstrom and Kate Merkel-Hess have a new piece at Foreign 
Policy discussing the recent joint report issued by the governments of China and Japan regarding the 
1937-38 Rape of Nanking. In“Nanjing By the Numbers”, they argue that focusing on the continued 
controversy over the massacre’s death toll overlooks the greater significance of the report: 
It would be too much to hope that any joint report over the causes and events of the Pacific War 
would reach accord on every issue. But as partisan as the debate on the Nanjing massacre has often 
seemed, a close reading of the new report shows that the divide in it over the number killed in that 
city is not exclusively a political standoff. Instead, it largely reflects scholarly concern over the 
reliability of the numbers — on both the Chinese and Japanese sides. And it would be unfortunate if 
the lack of agreement over death tolls obscured the significant new points of consensus. 
The main points of agreement constitute a major step forward in Sino-Japanese relations. For years, 
there have been some historians in Japan moving toward a more moderate position on Nanjing, but 
there have also been periodic efforts by Japanese officials to sidestep or minimize the issue of 
Japanese culpability and misbehavior, their sentiments echoed by a small number of textbooks 
authorized for use in Japan’s classrooms. Japanese leaders have historically ignored pleas to 
acknowledge fully the extent to which Japan was responsible for Pacific War-era devastation and 
violence not just in China but also in Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. So, all in all, the report has 
much to recommend it. 
For another analysis of the Rape of Nanking and its role in Sino-Japanese relations since 1945, see 
Mark Selden’s 2008 article in The Asis-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, “Japanese and American War 
Atrocities, Historical Memory and Reconciliation: World War II to Today.” 
2. Thomas Mullaney has previously written about the Chinese typewriter for The China Beat, and is 
currently working on a book on the subject. Stanford University’s “The Human Experience” site profiles 
Mullaney and his research; there’s both an article and a video of Mullaney explaining the history of “a 
problem that makes the QWERTY typewriter look like child’s play by comparison.” 
3. Shanghaiist recently cast its spotlight on a new and useful resource for those of us who don’t know 
much about the contemporary Chinese art scene:ArtSpeakChina, “the wiki on Chinese art.” The site 
offers a dual-language database that collects biographies of Chinese artists, explains the major 
elements of Chinese artistic movements (“what is the ‘Big Tail Elephant Group,’” you wonder? Check 
out the answer here), and provides a glossary of some helpful ideas and buzzwords. 
4. At Newsweek, Melinda Liu’s article, “U.S. of Who?”, examines the plight of China’s America-
watchers in recent years, as funding for Chinese academics to go abroad and study the United States 
has evaporated. Liu argues that the decreased amount of scholarly resources available for those 
working on the U.S. is due to a combination of factors: although it is partially related to America’s 
economic downturn, another element is that the Chinese government has shifted its focus inward: 
It’s not that Chinese leaders no longer care what the Americans think. They’re just so much more 
worried about what ordinary Chinese think. Growing prosperity and greater communication with the 
outside world have made the country’s more than 1.3 billion people much harder to manage than they 
used to be. Now it’s a matter of basic survival for party bosses to keep a close eye on public opinion. 
“Today’s government needs to be more responsive to rising nationalism among its own people,” says 
the dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, Wang Jisi. Widely regarded as 
China’s leading expert on the United States, he deplores the notion that America doesn’t matter 
anymore. “These days I’m studying China more than [I’m studying] the United States,” he says. 
5. Richard Rigby discusses “The Challenge of China” at East Asia Forum Quarterly. In this “big picture” 
piece, Rigby writes that China poses unique problems to observers attempting to assess the country 
through any sort of one-dimensional framework: 
If there is a single word that should be applied to China, whether speaking of its international impact 
or its domestic situation, it should be ‘complexity’. There is simply nothing simple about China; and 
this being the case, we should be distrustful of any simple descriptors or characterisations, be they 
benign — China’s peaceful rise, harmonious world, harmonious society — or the opposite, such as 
comparisons of a rising China with Wilhelmine Germany at the beginning of the last century. 
And with complexity comes size: expectations that China will take any path, the nature of which can 
be predicted from the experience of other countries are almost certainly going to be proved wrong. 
This was so of American hopes for a Westernised, democratic China emerging from World War II; it 
was so of the expectation post-1949 that China would become a clone as well as a client of the Soviet 
Union; and expectations have similarly been disappointed in both the pre-and post-1989 phases of the 
era of reform and opening. 
China is just too big, and carries too great a civilisational and historical throw-weight to be anything 
other than sui generis. 
Exchanges: “Reconciling Confucianism and Socialism” 
February 12, 2010 in Exchanges by The China Beat | Permalink 
Last month, we began a series called “Exchanges,” which invites authors to debate each other on a 
particular question. The first “Exchanges” post featured an essay by Daniel A. Bell and response from 
Michael Walzer on the topic of “Reconciling Confucianism and Socialism.” We also asked readers to 
submit their own thoughts on the subject, and received the commentary below from Peter Vernezze 
(which was also published at China From Afar). Bell, in turn, has written a reply to Vernezze’s critique. 
By Peter Vernezze 
In search of “a new moral foundation for political rule in China” because “communism has lost its 
capacity to inspire the Chinese,” Professor Bell asks whether Confucianism can step up and take this 
role. Not, according to Bell, if we stick to a traditional “conservative” or “official” Confucianism, which 
can simply be used to prioritize such values as “filial piety” and “harmony” as a way “to justify 
quietude and submission to the powers-that-be.” Bell as well rejects a classical liberal version of 
Confucianism because it tends to read the Confucian tradition through the lens of liberalism and not 
take Confucianism seriously in its own right. Instead, Bell advocates for what he calls a “left 
Confucianism” that draws on the socialist tradition for inspiration. There are six main tenets to his 
“leftist Confucianism”: 
1. Independent social and political criticism 
2. Concern for the disadvantaged 
3. Concern for basic material well-being 
4. Solidarity with strangers 
5. Global justice 
6. Religious toleration 
My problem is not that these are not six desirable tenets. Rather, the difficulty I have is that it is hard 
to see how any of these can be said to meaningfully follow from Confucianism. And, if no meaningful 
line can be drawn between Confucianism and the six tenets that Bell offers, then the extent to which 
the theory can be called Confucian must be called into question. 
To begin, Bell sees the Analects’ claim that exemplary persons should pursue harmony but not 
conformity as serving as the basis in Confucianism for his first tenet, a belief in the value of 
independent social and political criticism. A Confucian political criticism, he adds, would be far more 
restrained than we understand it in the West. It would be “carried out on the basis of social harmony 
and trust” as well as “motivated by affection rather than hostility and expressed in gentle and humble 
ways.” For left Confucianists, the media would be part of the mechanism of social criticism, but “[an 
important task of the] media should also be to promote social harmony by portraying moral 
exemplars.” Harmony, however, is much too abstract a concept to serve as a ground for meaningful 
social criticism. Indeed, one cannot imagine the most repressive social measure that could not be 
justified because it serves the goal of harmony. Indeed, most of them use precisely this justification. 
As such, a mere expressed preference for harmony over conformity would hardly seem to open the 
door for any meaningful social criticism. 
The second tenet in Bell’s leftist Confucianism is an obligation is to provide for the disadvantaged. 
However, Bell offers no text on this point except Mencius’s that “the government should give first 
consideration to ‘old men without wives, old women without husbands, old people without children, 
and young children without fathers.’” That this is the one Confucian text he cites demonstrates the 
lack of connection between this virtue and Confucianism, since the groups cited cannot be considered 
“disadvantaged” in a meaningful sense of the word without massively equivocating. The problem is 
that there is not the ground in theAnalects for an obligation among citizens —not one of the five 
relationships mentioned in the Analects involves this relation — and hence, no obligation to care for 
disadvantaged citizens. 
The third element of Bell’s leftist Confucianism is a concern for basic material well-being. Bell does not 
even follow the example in the previous point and offer a lame passage. He offers no text within the 
Confucian corpus to support this point. Instead he argues that “Confucians would choose economic 
equality and make social inequality work to support it.” Since the statement is not supported by any 
evidence in Bell’s article, it does not need to be refuted by any. 
The fourth trait of leftist Confucianism is solidarity with strangers. Here, at last, Bell offers up a 
Confucian text and tries to connect it with the trait in question. Unfortunately, the argument is 
unpersuasive. Bell cites a claim from the famous opening passage of The Great Learning: “…when the 
family is regulated, the state will be in order; and when the state is in order, there is peace 
throughout the world.” Bell wants to argue that “the idea is that ties should be extended from the 
family to the state and ultimately to the whole world.” However, the text does not say that taking care 
of family will lead to a concern for strangers, which is what Bell’s thesis requires. It simply says that 
when the family is taken care of, then the state will be in order. This implies no more than that the 
family being regulated is a sufficient condition of the state being well-ordered. It does not imply a 
concern for anyone outside of the family is necessary for the state to be well-ordered. For much the 
same reason it seems unlikely that a concern for “global justice,” Bell’s fifth trait of leftist 
Confucianism, can be linked to that philosophical system. 
The sixth and final aspect of Bell’s leftist Confucianism is religious toleration. He does not so much 
offer a positive argument as to why leftist Confucianism would tolerate other religions as a negative 
one. “Left Confucians do not take a strong position regarding religion. Following the example of the 
early Confucian thinkers, they leave metaphysical commitments open, focusing on the problems of 
earthly.” But a concern for the earthly does not in itself assure that Confucianism will lean towards 
religious toleration. Indeed, if a concern for the social good were part of a Confucian ideal than a 
religious view that presented an alternate social good would hardly be tolerated: witness Han Yu’s 
attack on Buddhism. 
In conclusion, while I admire Professor Bell’s effort, I fear thinkers will have to look elsewhere than 
Confucianism to find a philosophical system compatible with a leftist/liberal ideology. 
Response by Daniel A. Bell 
I am grateful for the thoughtful response to my article. Let me try to clarify my intentions, which may 
help to dispel areas of disagreement. I agree that the six tenets do not follow from Confucianism. 
But that’s not my argument. My strategy in the article is to take six widely-agreed upon humane and 
progressive values and to think about how they might have particular characteristics if they are 
interpreted via a Confucian moral framework. 
Let me address some of the points made about the particular values. Again, I agree with much that is 
said. For example, I agree that harmony is “much too abstract a concept to serve as a ground 
for social criticism.” But it can serve as a ground for social criticism if we try to understand what 
Confucians mean by the harmony. The line from the Analects that exemplary persons pursue harmony 
instead of conformity is known to most educated Chinese. And the contrast between harmony and 
conformity, as mentioned in the article, comes from the Zuo Zhuan, where it clearly refers to the idea 
that the ruler should be open to different political views. Yes, the term harmony can be misused by 
political authorities to justify political conformity, just as any other idea can be misused (think of all 
the damage done in the name of promoting freedom and democracy). All Confucian social critics can 
do is point to the gap between the ideal and the reality. 
Regarding the second value. I agree that the Analects does not focus on the relation between citizen 
and citizen. But it doesn’t follow that Confucians cannot think about the question of what the 
government should do for the people and the different kinds of obligations owed to different kinds of 
people. Mencius argues that the government should give first consideration to those deprived of key 
family ties, and I think that’s a distinctive and morally defensible way of thinking about our obligations 
to the disadvantaged. 
Anyway, if the concern is to provide more references to the Confucian sources that inspired the 
arguments of this paper, let me immodestly refer to my books China’s New Confucianism and Beyond 
Liberal Democracy, where I develop these ideas in greater depth. Having said that, it might not be so 
important to go through each tenet to “prove” that I’m putting forward a Confucian viewpoint; it might 
be more fruitful to ask whether the viewpoints put forward in the article are worth defending in 
contemporary China. I do believe they are inspired by the Confucian tradition – I would not have come 
up with these ideas had I not studied and learned from the rich and diverse Confucian tradition – but 
at the end of the day the label used to describe those ideas may not be so crucial. If they are 
implemented under a different label I would not lose any sleep. 
Be Sociable, Share! 
 
